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Abstract
A growing body of  literature examines how to make the use of  new and emerging technolo-
gies more transparent and explainable as a means to ensure accountability for harm to human 
rights. While a critical part of  accountability, a predominant focus on the technology can 
result in the design and adaptation of  accountability principles to ‘manage’ the technology 
instead of  starting from an assessment of  the governance choices actors make when inte-
grating new and emerging technologies into their mandates. Recognition of  the governance 
choices underpinning the introduction of  new and emerging technologies is often overlooked in 
scholarship and practice. Yet, without explicit recognition of  the role played by technology in 
governance, the disruptive effects of  technology on (global) governance may be underplayed 
or even ignored. In this response, I argue that if  the ‘culture of  accountability’ is to adapt to 
the challenges posed by new and emerging technologies, the focus cannot only be technology-
led. It must also be interrogative of  the governance choices that are made within organiza-
tions, particularly those vested with public functions at the international and national level.
1. Introduction
In a rich Foreword to this volume, Eyal Benvenisti traces the evolution of  a ‘culture of  
accountability’ in global governance, particularly of  international organizations. He 
expresses concern that these tools, while still evolving, may become ‘redundant’ in a 
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context in which new and emerging technologies play a central role in governance 
structures.1 He observes that this is both because of  the power of  global technology 
companies and the nature of  these technologies.2 His Foreword raises the critical ques-
tion of  whether accountability principles, such as those embodied by global adminis-
trative law, but also embedded in international human rights law, and the rule of  law 
more generally, can effectively adjust and adapt to this new context.3
In this response, I  suggest that the way in which the employment of  new and 
emerging technologies is understood and framed is central to the sustainability and 
adaptability of  accountability principles. The effects these technologies can have on 
the rights of  individuals and groups are increasingly acknowledged. Initially, the focus 
centred on the risks to privacy but has now expanded to recognize the potential for 
discrimination and inequality as well as the wider threats to all human rights posed 
by new and emerging technologies.4 A growing body of  literature critically examines 
the possibilities for addressing these risks through the lens of  the technology itself. 
For example, the literature on ‘algorithmic accountability’ questions whether and 
how algorithms can be made more transparent and explainable in order to facilitate 
accountability when their use adversely affects human rights or causes other types of  
societal harms.5
Addressing the constraints of  the technology constitutes a critical component to 
building an effective accountability framework. However, if  the sole focus, the risk 
arises that the governance choices actors – particularly those with public functions – 
make, in integrating new and emerging technologies into their mandates are over-
looked, and therefore not subject to a critical and accountable lens. Without recog-
nizing the role of  technology in governance, as Benvenisti documents, the disruptive 
effects of  technology on (global) governance may be underplayed or even bypassed. 
This has a direct effect on the accountability framework, which may then result in the 
design and adaptation of  accountability principles to ‘manage’ the technology rather 
than starting from an assessment of  the governance choices enabled by the new tech-
nology. Recognition of  the governance choices underpinning the introduction of  new 
and emerging technologies is often overlooked in scholarship and practice. However, 
in this response, I suggest that if  the ‘culture of  accountability’ is to adapt to the chal-
lenges posed by new and emerging technologies, the focus cannot only be technology-
led. It must also be interrogative of  the choices that are made within the governance 
of  organizations, particularly those vested with public functions at the international 
and national level.
1 Benvenisti, ‘Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of  New Technology: What Role for the Law of  
Global Governance?’ 29 European Journal of  International Law (EJIL) (2018) 9 at 55, at Section 4C.
2 Ibid., at 66.
3 See Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ 17 EJIL (2006) 187.
4 L. McGregor, ‘Cambridge Analytica is more than a data breach – it’s a human rights problem’ 
The Conversation (4 June 2018), available at http://theconversation.com/cambridge-analytica- 
is-more-than-a-data-breach-its-a-human-rights-problem-96601.
5 See the literature infra notes 6 and 7.
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2. Technology-Led Accountability as an Incomplete 
Approach
A burgeoning literature addresses the effects that using algorithms in decision-mak-
ing can have on those subject to the decision.6 The literature focuses on ways in which 
to make algorithms more transparent and ‘explainable’ as a means to aid accountabil-
ity for harm caused by their use.7 Benvenisti builds on this literature in two key ways. 
First, he highlights the role of  human dignity in any decision-making process, and 
notes the challenges posed in this regard by big data-driven algorithms.8 Algorithms 
work on the basis of  correlation not causation and produce outputs at a group or 
population level, but which are not determinative in relation to specific individuals. 
Benvenisti points out that such categorization of  ‘individuals into groups based on pre-
determined factors – in other words, based on the stereotyped objectifying of  human 
beings’ is ‘[d]irectly at odds with the very notion of  human dignity – the understand-
ing that the law must treat each individual as being unique’.9
Second, he highlights the impact of  the use of  algorithms within decision-making 
on the role of  discretion, which he characterizes as a central feature of  global admin-
istrative law. He argues that the use of  algorithms in decision-making distorts the 
duty to exercise discretion with an open mind.10 Given the nature of  algorithms and 
the manner in which they work – which, as indicated above, operates on the basis of  
population-level not individual-specific analysis – there is a risk that they fail to take 
into account the unique characteristics of  a specific individual which is a key aspect of  
discretion within decision-making.
Most of  the literature on ‘algorithmic accountability’ acknowledges the risks and 
challenges posed by such technology and asks how they might be addressed through 
adaptive techniques. This includes analysis of  ways to preserve human dignity and dis-
cretion within decision-making processes that are made or supported by algorithms. 
This is a critical aspect of  the accountability framework but one which is built around 
the acceptance of  the involvement of  technology and adaptation of  accountability 
principles to it. It therefore does not start from the question of  whether actors are mak-
ing a governance choice about the removal, reduction or reconfiguration of  discretion 
6 Mittelstadt et  al., ‘The Ethics of  Algorithms: Mapping the Debate’, 3(2) Big Data and Society (2016); 
D.  Kehl, et  al., ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of  Risk Assessments in 
Sentencing’, Responsive Communities (2017); Kroll et al., ‘Accountable Algorithms’, 165(3) University of  
Pennsylvania Law Review (2017) 633.
7 Kroll ibid.; Ananny and Crawford, ‘Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of  the Transparency Ideal 
and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability’, 20 New Media and Society (2016) 973; Citron and 
Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’, 89(1) Washington Law Review 
(2014) 1; Zarsky, ‘The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency 
and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making’, 41(1) Science, Technology and Human Values 
(2016) 118; Diakopoulos, ‘Algorithmic Accountablity: Journalistic Investigation of  Computational 
Power Structures, 3(3) Digital Journalism (2015) 398.
8 Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 54.
9 Ibid., at 54.
10 Ibid., at 55.
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and whether this choice should be subject to a process of  scrutiny and examination. 
In any other context, a departure (or even quasi-departure) from established ways of  
working – particularly by a public body – would require public scrutiny and justifica-
tion through an accountability process. This is because methodologies, like discretion, 
embody key standards of  fairness and recognized modes of  governance within society. 
Yet, where the departure is manifested through technology, the shift may be minimized 
and go unrecognized due to the tendency to treat technology instrumentally.
Technology-led approaches to accountability are particularly evident in debates on 
humans ‘in’ and ‘on’ the loop. For example, arguments have been made that discretion 
is not affected – or the effects are mitigated – where a human is still either ‘in’ or ‘on the 
loop’.11 A human is ‘in the loop’ where the human is the actual decision-maker, and their 
decision is merely informed by the algorithm. In principle, the human retains the ability 
to introduce discretion regardless of  the conclusion reached by the algorithm as a piece 
of  supporting evidence. Concerns arise, however, that the human decision-maker may 
defer to the conclusion reached by the algorithm or afford it significant weight due to 
the purported scientific calculations it makes.12 The risk of  deference is likely to increase 
in relation to ‘higher stakes’ decisions. For example, in the context of  a parole decision 
for a person convicted of  a serious crime, a human may be reluctant to overturn a high 
algorithmically produced risk score, given the potential consequences that the person 
may re-offend. In such a situation, the decision of  the human would likely be scrutinized, 
including a requirement to explain why they ‘went against’ the findings of  the algorithm.
A human ‘on the loop’ is where the algorithm is the actual decision-maker but a 
human reviews its decisions. In principle, discretion could be applied by the human 
reviewer to challenge the algorithm’s findings. However, this would first depend on the 
terms of  the review which may only be aimed at identifying cases of  clear unfairness 
or discrimination, for example, rather than a wholesale review of  the facts. Where the 
reviewer is not able to review the facts and evidence afresh, the likelihood of  discretion 
regularly playing a part in the decision is remote.
The example of  discretion demonstrates the significant shift enabled by the intro-
duction of  new and emerging technologies into how organizations, such as the judi-
ciary, function which is much more profound than a ‘technological upgrade’. Yet, the 
foregoing also illustrates that a focus on accountability structures that try to adapt 
principles around technology rather than examining what is happening to fundamen-
tal principles, like discretion, may mask the size and nature of  that shift.
3. Layering in Actor-Focused Accountability
Treating the incorporation of  new and emerging technologies as a governance choice 
may be more revealing and thus facilitate greater recognition and scrutiny into the 
11 See Asaro, ‘On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the 
Dehumanization of  Lethal Decision-making’, 94 International Review of  the Red Cross (2012).
12 Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’, 85 Washington University Law Review (2008) 1249, at 1271.
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rationale and justification for such choices and a fuller recognition of  their effect on 
underlying principles and recognized modes of  governance. In the example of  discretion, 
it would widen the debate out from ways in which to ensure humans are ‘in’ or ‘on’ the 
loop to a recognition that, even where this could be achieved, the way in which discretion 
operates has changed. This would then require analysis of  whether and when a change in 
the position of  discretion is legitimate and acceptable, thus directing the focus to account-
ability of  the actor who made the governance choice to change the role of  discretion.
These types of  governance shifts are evident across a range of  bodies with a public 
mandate, whether at the international or national level. For example, Fleur Johns uses 
the shift to the use of  biometric registration by the UN Office for the High Commissioner 
for Refugees to discuss the ways in which technology can expand ‘international law’s 
and institution’s capacity’.13 She discusses two guides on refugee determinations pro-
duced in the 1990s which ‘contemplate the use of  computers … [but] in limited and 
mostly instrumental terms’ within a wider determination process as ‘complex, cre-
ative and intensely human’.14 She contrasts these to a shift towards biometric reg-
istration that radically alters the nature of  the decision-making process. Using this 
and other examples, she warns that ‘[e]xercises of  international legal authority that 
cannot be understood, represented, or justified in recognizable terms may be prone to 
rejection’.15 This point emphasizes that transparency and scrutiny of  shifts in govern-
ance choices are not only important for accountability purposes but for the wider trust 
and confidence in organizations that carry out public functions.
Starting from the position of  governance choices also enables a wider lens on the 
impact of  the introduction of  new and emerging technologies on the full mandate of  
the actor rather than only on the direct effects of  the technology concerned. The role 
of  technology in policing provides another example of  the potential reshaping of  the 
way a particular task or mandate is carried out. Significant concerns have been raised 
about the risks of  predictive policing to privacy and the threats to discrimination and 
profiling of  individuals and communities, where it is used. However, there are also 
questions regarding the deployment of  predictive policing tools in an operational con-
text, and how this will affect police officers’ ability to engage with the public, and to 
draw on their own experience. The concern is that officers will become overly depen-
dent on technology and will engage in ‘tablet policing’16 at the expense of  commu-
nity policing, for example.17 Such a shift could introduce its own security and human 
rights implications as well as impact on trust in key public bodies like the police which, 
while not caused by the new and emerging technology itself, could result from the pol-
icy decision to prioritize that way of  working. Where questions of  accountability only 
13 Johns, ‘Data, Detection and the Redistribution of  the Sensible in International Law’ 111 American Journal 
of  International Law (2017) 57 at 58.
14 Ibid., at 80.
15 Ibid., at 59.
16 I.e., following instructions delivered by their tablet devices.
17 This potentially affects the ability to deliver policing by consent. For a discussion on policing by con-
sent, referencing the Peel Principles, see UK Home Office, ‘Definition of  policing by consent’, 10 
December 2012, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/
definition-of-policing-by-consent.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/29/4/1079/5320175 by U
niversity of Essex user on 08 April 2019
1084 EJIL 29 (2018), 1079–1085
focus on how to minimize risks to human rights where predictive policing is used, they 
risk missing the potential for ‘organizational and systemic trade-offs’18 that may also 
entail risks. These risks – including of  mandate trade-offs – may be even greater where 
the introduction of  technology requires investment at a time where many national 
and international organizations with public functions face significant budget cuts. 
This may mean that parts of  an organization’s mandate are reduced – or even cut – 
while technological capability is increased, again requiring scrutiny.
The foregoing analysis illustrates that the employment of  technology not only has 
the potential to adversely impact rights but also potentially changes the way in which 
a key public organization functions, raising significant governance questions. Yet, 
because it is enabled by technology, the change in the fulfilment of  the mandate is at 
risk of  a lack of  scrutiny.
This is not to mean that all shifts carry significant risks or actually change the meth-
odology of  a mandate. For example, Future Advocacy and the Wellcome Trust have 
noted that in the health context the use of  artificial intelligence techniques such as 
automation ‘may free up HCP [healthcare practitioners] time that is currently occupied 
by routine administrative tasks, allowing them to spend more time interacting with 
patients’.19 Thus, the employment of  technology may also (re)enable a preferred means 
of  fulfilling a mandate. However, it should be noted that this example clearly contains 
technology to an assistive rather than displacement task. Moreover, the report notes 
that this shift may not be stable in that ‘as the technology improves and more tasks 
become automatable, it is increasingly possible that fewer ‘human practitioners’ will 
be required to run healthcare systems worldwide’, meaning that there would be fewer 
nurses to spend time ‘interacting with patients’.20 This again illustrates the importance 
of  accountability for governance choices, including an accountability model that can 
predict how technology may distort and disrupt governance choices in the future.
Starting with the mandate and the actor is also a counter to the concern that prin-
ciples laid out in global administrative law, but also the rule of  law more broadly and 
human rights,21 are at risk of  becoming ‘obsolete’. This is because they can require 
transparency and openness in the governance choices organizations propose to make 
and critically embed the principle of  ‘bidirectional communication’, which Benvenisti 
frames as a central tool of  accountability, through participation in the co-option and 
design choices of  such organizations. As noted in the Future Advocacy and Wellcome 
Trust report, ‘[t]here is [currently] a risk that these technologies are developed with-
out the input of  patients and those who use them – that is, the people who will be 
most impacted by these technologies’.22 ‘Points of  friction’ are often available once the 
18 Sandvik, Jacobsen and McDonald, ‘Do No Harm: A  Taxonomy of  the Challenges of  Humanitarian 
Experimentation’ 99(1) International Review of  the Red Cross (2017) 319, at 324.
19 Future Advocacy and Wellcome Trust, Ethical, Social and Political Challenges of  Artificial Intelligence in 
Health (2018) available at: https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ai-in-health-ethical-social-politi-
cal-challenges.pdf  at 26.
20 Ibid., at 27.
21 See Harlow, supra note 3.
22 Future Advocacy, supra note 19, at 36.
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decision to employ the technology has been made (thus containing the question to 
how the technology operates and mitigation measures, as discussed above). Although 
not a term of  art, ‘points of  friction’ are means by which the approach and assump-
tions of  the responsible entity are tested and challenged, and alternative points of  
view are raised and addressed. However, these points are not currently available at the 
point of  choice and analysis of  the impact of  new and emerging technologies on those 
directly affected as well as on the fulfilment of  an organization’s mandate as a whole. 
Yet, this is the point at which the ‘culture of  accountability’ discussed by Benvenisti in 
his article has some of  the greatest potential for bite.
4. Conclusion
This article concludes that more work is needed to situate the demands for technolog-
ical or algorithmic accountability within a wider accountability framework of  govern-
ance choice. It thus locates questions of  accountability with the actors that employ 
technology as part of  a wider accountability matrix that also needs to address the 
wider global power dynamics of  technology companies and the specificities of  how 
technologies function. Starting with the choices the actors are making to embed 
technology rather than only from the perspective of  the technology provides a fuller 
accountability lens and also means for transparency and scrutiny. This is because it 
starts from a recognized position of  how actors carry out their mandates, and interro-
gates why a shift is needed and how that advances rather than degrades the principles 
on which that mandate is based; and where it does not, whether that can be overcome. 
From an administrative law perspective, such decisions to employ technology should 
therefore be transparent and subject to review as well as open to participation, consul-
tation and feedback through models such as ‘bidirectional communication’.
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